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INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF SECTION 301(a)
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of Title III of the Labor-Management Relations Act is
to equalize the legal responsibilities of labor organizations and employers,'
and liability for breach of collective bargaining agreements was one of
the more important areas in which the Eightieth Congress considered
legislation necessary to accomplish this purpose. The inequality which
the legislation sought to remedy stemmed from the difficulty of subjecting
unions to suit. Unions, as unincorporated associations, cannot be sued
at common law as an entity, and their assets were difficult to reach. Con-
sequently, the legislators felt that union breaches were "acts for which,
under existing laws, unions . . . often escape liability but for which
all other citizens must answer in court." 2 Although in most states the
inequality does not exist because the common-law rules are not applied,3
the desired mutuality of responsibility could not be fully attained "until
all jurisdictions, and particularly the Federal Government, authorized ac-
tions against labor unions as legal entities." 
4
The statutory plan to achieve the ultimate objective of mutual en-
forcement of the collective bargaining agreements is embodied in Section
301. Subsection (b) provides that "any such labor organization may
sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it rep-
resents in the courts of the United States." VvWhile this provision would
eliminate the cause of the inequality in the suits to which it can be applied,
it does not confer jurisdiction. In order to eliminate obstacles to en-
forceability of the agreements generally, it was necessary to bring the suits
for violation of the agreements within the operation of Section 301(b),
that is, to permit the- suits to be brought in the federal courts. This func-
1. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
2. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947).
3. For a summary of the status of labor unions in the state courts see Kaye
& Allen, Union Responsibility and the Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments, 30 B.U.L. Rnv. 1, 7-15 (1950); H.R. MINoaRry RE,. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 108 (1947). At the passage of the Act there were only 13 states in which unions
were not amenable to suit as an entity.
4. SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947).
5. 61 STAT. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1952).
6. Murphy v. Hotel Employees Union, AFL, 102 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Mich. 1951);
Kriss v. White, 87 F. Supp. 734 (N.D.N.Y. 1949); see Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v.
Textile Workers Union, CIO, 167 F.2d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 1948); Square D Co. V.
United Elec. Workers Union, 123 F. Supp. 776, 782 (E.D. Mich. 1954) ; Rock Drilling
Union v. Mason & Hangar Co., 90 F. Supp. 539, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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tion is performed by the jurisdictional grant of Section 301 (a), which
thus is the crux of the legislative scheme.
Section 301(a) provides that:
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined by this Act, or between any such labor organiza-
tions, may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 7
The enactment of this section presents difficulties which the Congress did
not foresee and which almost five years of judicial construction have failed
to settle. Conflicting theories and different results are found in almost
every situation in which the section is relied upon. For example, in the
only case in which the Supreme Court has intervened,8 the net result of
the decision was to exclude from the coverage of the section a type of
suit which almost all of the lower courts had assumed to be included and to
raise doubts about the constitutionality of the section. The following
discussion examines four separate problems which the enactment of Section
301(a) has raised: (1) the scope and constitutionality of the section;
(2) its effect upon the enforcement of arbitration clauses; (3) the relief
available; and (4) the parties which are properly within the section's
jurisdictional grant.
CONSTITUTIONALITY AND SCOPE OF SECTION 301 (a)
Constitutional Theories and Congressional Intent
On its face Section 301 (a) is merely a grant of federal jurisdiction over
suits for violation of labor contracts. The section expressly eliminates
any requirement of diversity of citizenship, and therefore its constitu-
tionality hinges upon a determination of whether suits under it fall within
the "arising under . . . the Laws of the United States" clause of Article
III of the Constitution." Neither this section nor any other in the
national labor statutes explicitly creates or recognizes any privately en-
forceable rights which attach to labor contracts. Thus, there is an apparent
lack of a federal substantive law under which every suit for violation of
such a contract could be said to "arise." 10 However, if the section is con-
strued as a direction to supply and develop a federal common law to govern
7. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952).
8. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
75 Sup. Ct. 488 (1955). See text at notes 33-37, 205-16 infra.
9. But cf. text at notes 21-24 infra. U.S. CoNsT. Art. III, §2 provides: "The
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under . . . the Laws of the
United States ..
10. Even if some specific rights attaching to collective bargaining agreements
vere to be found elsewhere in the federal statutes, these rights could not be relied
upon to sustain a grant of jurisdiction over cases not involving those rights.
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the rights of the parties, the adjudication of cases arising under this federal
law would be well within the judicial power." If this construction is not
adopted, serious theoretical difficulties are presented; 12 but the absence of
a governing federal substantive law is not in itself conclusive of invalidity.
In the landmark case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States 13 the Supreme
Court upheld a grant of federal jurisdiction over all suits to which the bank
was a party, 14 including suits which did not involve the interpretation of
the statute creating the bank and which were governed by state commercial
law. The Court reasoned that the existence of the charter supplied the
necessary federal "original ingredient" 15 in every suit. However, an
analogy to the Osborn case, through substitution of the union or the em-
ployer for the bank, does not sustain the 301 (a) grant; neither is a federal
entity as was the bank, which derived its existence and all its faculties from
the act of Congress creating it.' Employers and unions are neither created
nor empowered to act by federal authority 17 and consequently the necessary
federal ingredient must be found elsewhere than in the identity of the
parties.
This element can more easily be discovered by reference to the
contract. The section also can be construed as establishing as substantive
law only the principle that labor contracts shall be legally binding upon the
contracting parties, leaving the existence and interpretation of a particular
right under a particular contract to be determined by state law. Such
a jurisdictional grant would be within the Osborn holding because the
question of the enforceability of the contract, like the ability of the bank
to sue or be sued, would lie at the foundation of the cause to which juris-
diction is extended. To paraphrase the language of the Court, "The right
to sue (in the case of Section 301 (a) the enforceability of the contract),
if decided once, is decided forever; but the power of Congress was exer-
11. See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COL. L. REV.
157, 186 (1953).
12. These problems are extensively and authoritatively discussed in Mishkin,
mpra note 11, at 186-96; Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor
Disputes, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 114, 118-31 (1948); Note, 57 YALE L.J. 630
(1948); see also Wallace, The Contract Cause of Action Under the Taft-Hartley Act,
16 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1949).
13. 9 Wheat. 738 (U.S. 1824).
14. 3 STAT. 269 (1816).
15. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 824 (U.S. 1824).
16. Id. at 823.
17. See Forrester, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13
LAW & CoNTE P. PROB. 114, 124, 129 (1948). Employers could hardly be considered
federally-created entities in any sense. Section 301(b), 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1952), which provides that a union "may sue and be sued as an
entity . . .in the courts of the United States" cannot be said to create a union entity
in the sense that the bank was created, because the union is made an entity only for
the purposes of suit in the federal courts. Union status in the state courts is unaffected.
Bunch v. Launius, 222 Ark. 760, 262 S.W2d 461 (1953). Even in the federal courts
unions are not always treated as entities. For example, they may still bring a class
suit, Tisa v. Potofsky, 90 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), and citizenship for diversity
purposes is determined by the citizenship of the individual parties. Murphy v. Hotel
& Restaurant Employees, AFL, 102 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Mich. 1951); Brooks v.
Hunkin-Conkey Construction Co., 95 F. Supp. 608 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
SECTION 301(a) OF THE LMRA
cised antecedently to the first decision on that right, and if it was consti-
tutional then, it cannot cease to be so because the particular question is
decided. . . . The question forms an original ingredient in every cause." 18
If the Osborn case is deemed to have established the propriety of
utilizing the federal courts as a protective haven for a federal legislative
plan,' 9 Section 301(a) would be constitutional even if construed as only
a procedural measure. Under this theory, federal jurisdiction is necessary
to protect the congressional regulatory scheme in the field of labor rela-
tions. Even though state law would be controlling, the federal courts'
knowledge and receptiveness to the national policy would insure a fairer
and more proper application than would exist in the state courts. Sim-
ilarly, it was necessary that the bank in Osborn be protected from dis-
crimination by the state courts, and federal judicial administration was in-
voked as the protective agency. Such suits are said to be within Article
III because they arise under the laws which comprise the legislative pro-
gram which is being protected. However, the courts have not as yet
employed the protective theory as their sole basis for upholding the
constitutionality of a statute and doubt has been expressed as to the
theory's validity.20
A possibility that the 301(a) grant of jurisdiction may be sustained
as a valid exercise of the Article I power to regulate commerce, without
reference to Article III, is raised by the rationale of three of the Supreme
Court justices in National Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Co.,21 which upheld
that section of the Judicial Code 22 opening the federal district courts to
suits between citizens of the District of Columbia and citizens of a state.,
Justices Black, Burton and Jackson reasoned that the legislation was valid
as an exercise of Congress' power over the District under Article 1.23
This view lacked a majority of the Court, as six justices explicitly rejected
the Article I approach 4 The Article I theory apparently is limited only
by the requirement that the jurisdictional grant be in an area over which
Congress possesses legislative powers. Since collective bargaining in in-
dustries affecting commerce is clearly subject to federal regulation under
the commerce clause, even an interpretation of Section 301(a) as merely
18. 9 Wheat. 738, 824 (U.S. 1824).
19. See Mishkin, supra note 11, at 187-96.
20. See the opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 75 Sup. Ct. 488, 495-96 (1955).
21. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952).
23. The Article I approach was made necessary by the unwillingness to overrule
the case of Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445 (U.S. 1805), which relied
heavily on the interpretation of the language of the Constitution in holding that a
citizen of the District of Columbia was not a citizen of a state within the meaning
of the judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 78 (1789) (now as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1952)).
24. Justices Rutledge and Murphy concurred on the ground that the District of
Columbia was a state within the meaning of Article III, and Chief Justice Vinson
and Justices Reed, Frankfurter, and Douglas dissented.
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a procedural measure would be sustained if the theory should be accepted
by a majority of the Supreme Court.
The legislative history contains no indication of congressional reliance
upon a particular theory under which Section 301(a) was considered to
be constitutional. The constitutional problems inherent in the section's
purely jurisdictional language were recognized only by the House2 5 and
Senate 26 committee minorities and their objections went unanswered. The
general expressions of the purpose of the section point to the conclusion
that Congress intended 301 (a) to have substantive content, but that it be
limited to the principle of enforceability. The attention of Congress was
focused upon the fact that the labor union entity, because of its status
as an unincorporated association, was not liable to suit for violation of col-
lective bargaining agreements. Although legislative intent could be logically
separable into a substantive end, attaching legally enforceable consequences
to collective bargaining agreements, and a procedural means, removing the
procedural obstacles to enforcement against unions, congressional language
contains both procedural and substantive elements. The House Report
states that unions must be subject to judicial remedies if they are to be
treated as responsible contracting partiesyt 7 and therefore Section 301(a)
"makes labor organizations equally responsible with employers for con-
tract violations and provides for suit by either against the other in the
United States district courts." 2 8 The Senate Report described the Senate
provision as one to "equalize legal responsibilities of labor organizations" 2
9
by making "collective-bargaining contracts equally binding and enforce-
able on both parties." 30 After reciting the difficulties in enforcing those
contracts against labor unions, and deciding that actions against labor
unions are necessary to "vitalize collective-bargaining agreements," the
Report concludes that "statutory recognition of the collective agreements
as a valid, binding and enforceable contract is a logical and necessary
step." 81 The meager statements during debate reflect a greater degree of
preoccupation with the procedural aspect of the measure than do the
committee reports.
3 2
25. H.R. RP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 109-10 (1947).
26. SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 14 (1947).
27. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1947).
28. Id. at 6.
29. SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st. Sess. pt. 1, at 1 (1947).
30. Id. at 15.
31. Id. at 17.
32. See, e.g., Representative Case: "... the bill establishes suability for and
by labor organizations as entities." 93 CoNG. REc. 6283 (1947). Senator Taft: "The
bill makes unions suable in the federal courts for violation of a contract . . . as if
they were corporations. . . ." 93 CONG. REc. 3839 (1947). "The purpose of title
III is to give employer and the employee the right to go to the Federal courts to
bring a suit to enforce the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement. . . ." 93
CONG. REc. 4141 (1947). "If we are to have free collective bargaining it must be
between two responsible parties. . . . There is no reason in the world why a union
should not have the same responsibility that a corporation has. . . . So we have
provided that a union may sue and be sued as if it were a corporation." 93 CONG.
REc. 7537 (1947).
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Even standing alohe, this emphasis on procedural reform is con-
sistent with the conclusion that Section 301(a) creates a substantive law
of enforceability. Constituting the union an entity for the purposes of
suit was but a step in the direction of making these agreements enforce-
able as are any other contracts. However, no evidence can be found that
Congress intended to create a complete body of federal common law nor
that the legislators realized that Section 301(a) would possibly have this
result; and the existing statutory language is quite inappropriate to fulfill
any such intention. Since it would have been comparatively easy for
Congress .explicitly to have directed the federal courts to apply a newly
created federal common law had it desired to do so, the substantive con-
tent of the section should be limited to the principle of enforceability.
Judicial Interpretations
The Supreme Court decision in Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Em-
ployees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.2 produced a three to three division
of opinion on the constitutional question; -4 but the Court by a vote of six
to two dismissed on the ground that the particular suit, a union's suit on
behalf of 4000 employees for wages due, was not within the coverage of
Section 301(a). Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion joined by Justices
Burton and Minton, voted for dismissal principally because the doubtful
validity of the section justified a narrow reading as a means of avoiding
decision of the constitutional issue. After an examination of the legis-
lative history Justice Frankfurter concluded that the section was purely
procedural and that the difficulties inherent in interpreting it as a direction
to develop either a federal common law of labor contracts or a more limited
federal concept of the nature of the collective bargaining contract, while
leaving detailed questions of interpretation to state law, precluded the
courts from attributing any substantive content to Section 301 in order
to save it from unconstitutionality. Viewed as purely procedural, the
section was considered to be outside the Osborn precedent. Although his
opinion noted an analogy between federal incorporation and Section 301's
vesting of "rights and liabilities, which under state law are distributed
among the union members, in a legal 'entity' recognized by federal law
for purposes of collective bargaining agreements," 35 Justice Frankfurter
thought that the treatment of the union as an entity for this limited purpose
was insufficient to sustain the jurisdictional grant. The fact that the
validity of the agreement might be contested on federal grounds also failed
to provide the necessary federal element. Justice Reed voted to dismiss
as a matter of statutory interpretation but thought that the grant of juris-
diction was constitutional. He saw no need to rely upon legislative history
because in his view Section 301, by granting jurisdiction over suits
33. 75 Sup. Ct. 488 (1955).
34. Justice Harlan did not participate in the case. Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Clark expressly declined to consider the constitutional question.
35. Id. at 495.
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for violation of collective bargaining agreements, made these violations
actionable as a matter of federal law. Although the federal courts might
be permitted to apply state law to many issues, this use of state law raises
no constitutional problems, for the rules, while derived from state sources,
would be applied at the direction and by permission of Congress and thus
constitute federal substantive law. Justices Douglas and Black, dissent-
ing from the dismissal, agreed with Justice Reed that the Act "created
federal sanctions for collective bargaining agreements, made the cases and
controversies concerning them justiciable questions for the federal courts,
and permitted the courts to fashion from the federal statute, from state
law, or from other germane sources, federal rules for the construction and
interpretation of those collective bargaining agreements." 36
Since the Supreme Court divided evenly on the issue of the con-
stitutionality of Section 301 the Westinghouse case serves only to heighten
doubts in this respect. It is difficult to see how Justices Frankfurter,
Burton and Minton can resolve their doubts in favor of constitutionality
so long as they adhere to their conclusion that the section is purely pro-
cedural, and consequently the fate of the section hinges upon the positions
taken by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Clark and Harlan. Even if
the views of Justice Reed should prevail the Westinghouse case furnishes
no criterion to guide the lower courts in choosing between state and fed-
erally created principles wherever a choice becomes necessary. Thus, both
the constitutionality and substantive content of Section 301 remain open
questions.
In every lower federal court which has considered the question, the
constitutionality of Section 301(a) has been upheld on the ground that
the suit which it permits is based upon federally-created substantive law.3
7
These courts, however, have not made a conclusive determination of
whether this federal law is an all-inclusive common law, or is merely the
principle of contractual enforceability, or is to be garnered from some other
portions of the labor statutes. In Waiaula Agricultural Co. v. United
Sugar Workers, ILWU,38 the court stated that although "Congress did
not undertake the task of expressing all the substantive federal law of col-
lective bargaining contracts, it is now in the course of declaration by the
courts, on the premise that Congress did impose federal liability." 3' The
36. Id. at 503.
37. United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Hamil-
ton Foundry & Machine Co. v. International Molders Workers, AFL, 193 F.2d
209 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. deaied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952); International Plainfield
Motor Co. v. Local 343, United Automobile Workers, CIO, 123 F. Supp. 683 (D.N.J.
1954) ; Waiaula Agricultural Co. v. United Sugar Workers, ILWU, 114 F. Supp. 243
(D. Hawaii 1953) ; Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers, CIO, 108 F. Supp.
45 (D. Del. 1952); Wilson & Co. v. United Packing House Workers, CIO, 83 F.
Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Colonial Hardwood Floor Co. v. United Furniture
Workers, 76 F. Supp. 493 (D. Md. 1948), aff'd, 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948).
38. 114 F. Supp. 243 (D. Hawaii 1953); see also International Longshoremen s
Ass'n v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 114 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D. Hawaii 1953).
39. Waiaula Agricultural Co. v. United Sugar Workers, ILWU, 114 F. Supp.
243, 246 (D. Hawaii 1953).
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language of Wilson & Co. v. United Packing House Workers, CIO,4 on
the other hand, is more consistent with the view that the intended substan-
tive law was only the principle of enforceability.41 Two other courts ap-
parently relied upon some other portions of the Act as the source of the
federal right.42  The decisions in cases where constitutionality was not dis-
cussed also fail to delineate clearly the extent and the basis of the substan-
tive content of Section 301, and there are decisions and dicta in support of
each point of view. In Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Car-
riers 4 the court upheld a refusal to charge in accordance with the state
law requirement that bad faith be shown, stating that a federal substantive
remedy had been created to which state law was inapplicable; and in Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers v. Dahlem Construction Co.44
the court applied a federal rule on the duration of contracts terminable at
will, after refusing to rely upon the state rule. However, the chosen federal
rule was identical to that of the state. Both of these cases indicate reliance
upon a broad construction of 301 as the source of a complete body of fed-
eral law, since enforceability alone would not preclude the application of
state law to these issues.
Other courts take the position that a substantive right has been created,
but they give no indication of the extent of that right. 45 Schatte v. Inter-
national Alliance 46 held that the section was inapplicable to a breach oc-
curring before its effective date because it created "a new substantive lia-
bility actionable in the federal courts"; 47 but the language of the case is in-
conclusive as to whether the court was adopting the federal common law
or the enforceability interpretation. Either theory would prevent retro-
40. 83 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
41. ". . . Congress recognized and regarded the observance and enforcement of
such contracts as a matter of federal concern incident to the regulation of commerce,
and intended to create a right in each of the parties to such contracts to the observance
and the performance thereof by the other. Section 301(a) . . . would be meaning-
less on any other hypothesis. . . ." Id. at 165.
42. Hamilton Foundry & Machine Co. v. International Molders Workers, AFL,
193 F2d 209, 214 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952) (treating the
contract as one recognized by the act, even though an oral one, the cause of action
upon it arises out of a law of the United States); Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v.
Textile Workers, CIO, 108 F. Supp. 45, 48 (D. Del. 1952) ("... the whole tenor
of the cited act created important substantive rights ... ") ; cf. United Elec.
Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376, 384-85 (8th Cir. 1953).
43. 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950).
44. 193 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1951).
45. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 210 F.2d 623, 625 (3d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 75 Sup. Ct. 488 (1955); Food
& Service Trades Council v. Retail Associates, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 221, 224 (N.D.
Ohio 1953); Pepper & Potter Inc. v. Local 977, United Automobile Workers, CIO,
103 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Local 793, United Automobile Workers,
CIO v. Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., 15 F.R.D. 261, 263-64 (W.D. Mich. 1951).
46. 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950); see Studio
Carpenters' Union v. Loew's, Inc., 182 F.2d 168, 169 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 828 (1950).
47. Schatte v. International Alliance, mipra note 46, at 164; ef. Boeing Airplane
Co. v. Aeronautical Int'l Assn of Machinists, 188 F2d 356 (9th Cir. 1951) (in-
corporated, by reference, lower court opinion, 91 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Wash. 1950),
which had held on the basis of state law).
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active application of the section, while a merely procedural approach would
not. The Tenth Circuit on the other hand, in declining to order further
arbitration on the ground that the parties had not requested it, stated that
the section is jurisdictional only and "does not give the federal courts any
different or additional power than a state court would have if the actions
had been brought there." 48 Still others have expressed doubt as to whether
a federal or state substantive law should control a particular issue, and have
avoided a resolution of the problem by stating that the issue would be
similarly decided under both 49 or that the issue involved was remedial
only.50
It appears from decisions in both the Ninth and the Third Circuits
that those courts will limit the scope of the federal law. The Ninth Circuit,
in Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Int'l Ass'n of Machinists,"' adopted
a lower court opinion 52 which held a contract rescinded in express reliance
upon state law and the Erie 5 doctrine. This same court, in Loew's, Inc.,54
had held previously that a federal substantive right was created, but the
conflict between that reasoning and the application of the Erie doctrine in
the later case was ignored. In a series of cases, the Third Circuit assumed
without discussion that state law controlled the issue of termination, 5 later
expressed doubt but avoided decision by stating that federal and state law
were the same, 56 and still later, sitting en bane, stated that a federal sub-
stantive right was created.57 If these cases in the same courts can be said
to be consistent, with one another it is only on the theory that state law is
to govern the incidents of the contract, which is to be made binding as a
matter of federal right. Neither circuit, however, has attempted to ration-
alize its decisions on any particular theory, and it is possible that a broader
approach might be adopted in future cases.
There are some indications that as factual situations recur they will be
decided in reliance upon similar cases under Section 301(a), and that in
this way the federal law adopted will control the disposition of cases to the
48. Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers, CIO, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th
Cir. 1951).
49. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 204 F.2d
495, 498-99 (3rd Cir. 1953).
50. Textile Workers, CIO v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529, 533 (4th Cir. 1951);
Textile Workers, CIO v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953);
Hamilton Foundry & Machine Co. v. International Molders Workers, AFL, 193
F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952) (Alternative holding).
51., 188 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1951).
52. 91 F. Supp. 596, 614 (W.D. Wash. 1950).
53. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
54. Studio Carpenters' Union v. Loew's, Inc., 182 F.2d 168 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950).
55. See Patterson Parchment Paper Co. v. International Brotherhood of Paper
Makers, 191 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir. 1951) ; cf. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union AFL v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. Pa. 1954)..
56. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291 Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 204 F.2d 495, 498-99
(3d Cir. 1953).
57. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 210 F.2d 623, 625 (3d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 75 Sup. Ct. 488 (1955).
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exclusion of state law. Such a trend appears to be developing in the fre-
quent cases under Section 301 (a) involving the interpretation of the scope
of arbitration clauses, which are quite similar in phraseology.58 As other
factual situations are presented against a background of similar cases they
too might be decided on the basis of federal case law. However, no sig-
nificant change has been effected in the area of more general legal prin-
ciples, except for those cases which have used the section to avoid de-
pendence upon the Arbitration Act 6 9 in granting specific performance of
arbitration agreements.60 A choice of state versus federal law seldom has
been a determining factor, and thus a broad construction of the substantive
content of the section has not been utilized to develop a federal case law
which is noticeably divergent from state law.
Most of the cases decided under Section 301 (a) have produced a result
which is consistent with that intended by the legislature. Congress went
no further than to make collective bargaining agreements legally binding,
and most courts have not expanded this intent into the creation of novel
rights unforeseen by the legislators; substantive content has been incor-
porated in the section only to the extent necessary to sustain its constitu-
tionality. By limiting the substantive content, the courts have refused to
take advantage of an opportunity to develop an applicable federal concept
which would be more closely related to the functions of collective bargaining
than those of ordinary contracts."' Nevertheless, reliance upon the mean-
ing attributed to similar factual situations in other federal decisions pre-
serves some degree of uniformity within the federal courts, and statements
of the creation of substantive law will enable a court to avoid the effect of
state doctrines which are serious obstacles to enforcement. So long as the
substantive content is thus limited, treatment of Section 301 (a) as a partly
substantive law is justified by the legislative history and serves to insure the
constitutionality of the jurisdictional grant.
THE IMPACT OF SECTION 301(a) UPON THE ENFORCEMENT
OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
Arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements become an issue
in suits under Section 301 (a) in a variety of ways, each of which presents
58. See Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 217 F.2d 49, 53
(6th Cir. 1954); United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376, 384-85 (8th
Cir. 1953) ; Markel Elec. Products, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 202 F.2d 435, 437
(2d Cir. 1953) ; Square D Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 123 F. Supp. 776, 782 (E.D.
Mich. 1954) ; Harris Hub Bed & Spring Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 121 F. Supp.
40, 42 (M.D. Pa. 1954); Metal Polishers Union, AFL v. Rubin, 85 F. Supp. 363,
364 (E.D. Pa. 1949). But cf. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, AFL v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Industrial Trades Union v.
Woonsocket Dyeing Co., 122 F. Supp. 872, 874 (D.R.I. 1954).
59. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1952).
60. See text at notes 100-07, 114-18, infra.
61. For a discussion of the applicability of contract concepts to collective bar-
gaining agreements see GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 381-84 (1946); Warns, The
Nature of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 3 MiAMi L.Q. 235, 250 (1949);
Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 HARv. L. Rxv. 572, 606-07
(1931).
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different problems. A clause may be interposed defensively in a suit for
damages by a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration; 6 2 or it may
form the basis of an action for enforcement, such as a suit seeking an order
compelling submission of an issue to arbitration,63 enforcement of an arbi-
tration award, 4 or an award of damages for a breach.6 Defendants also
may set up a plaintiff's prior breach of the clause as a bar to recovery for
defendants' subsequent breach of other parts of the agreement.es
Specific statutory authority for granting a stay pending arbitration is
available under some interpretations of the United States Arbitration Act.
7
These courts include collective bargaining agreements within the Act and
therefore can rule upon the merits of the motion without reference to Sec-
tion 301(a). Conflicts in applying the Arbitration Act arise from different
interpretations of the last clause of Section 1 and Section 3. Section 1,
after defining "maritime transactions" and "commerce," concludes with the
words "but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employ-
inent of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign. or interstate commerce," 0s; Section 3 provides that a stay of pro-
ceedings pending arbitration shall be granted in "any suit or proceeding
.. upon any issue referrable to arbitration under an agreement in writ-
ing for such arbitration." 09 All the circuits which have ruled on the matter
are now in agreement that the "contracts of employment" exclusion applies
to the entire Act, but here the unanimity ends. The Fourth Circuit holds
62. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir.
1954) ; United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th
Cir. 1954); Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d
Cir. 1953); Markel Elec. Products, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 202 F.2d 435
(2d Cir. 1953) ; Harris Hub Bed & Spring Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 121 F. Supp.
40 (M.D. Pa. 1954); Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers Union, CIO,
108 F. Supp. 45 (D. Del. 1952); Boston & Maine Transp. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n,
106 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1952); Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers,
CIO, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Metal Polishers, AFL v. Rubin, 85 F.
Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
63. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, AFL v. Prudential Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp.
869 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Industrial Trades Union v. Woonsocket Dyeing Co., 122
F. Supp. 872 (D.R.I. 1954); Local 379, United Automobile Workers, CIO v.
Jacobs Mfg. Co., 120 F. Supp. 228 (D. Conn. 1953) ; Local 207, United Elec. Workers
v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 119 F. Supp. 877 (D. Conn. 1954); Textile Workers
Union, CIO v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C. 1950). Specific enforce-
ment may also be obtained by way of a counterclaim in an action for damages.
Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Columbia Typographical Union, 124 F. Supp. 322
(D.D.C. 1954).
64. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers Union v. Gillespie Milk Products Corp., 203
F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1953); Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union,
187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951), affirming in part ad reversing in part, 89 F. Supp. 702
(W.D. Okla. 1950).
65. While no suits for damages for refusal to arbitrate have been reported,
there seems to be nothing other than inability to establish damages which would
prevent such a suit. At common law, damages for breach of such an agreement
are nominal only. See REsTATEmNTr, COTRAcrs § 550 (1932); Arbitration of
Labor Disputes, 43 ILL. L. REv. 678, 680 (1948).
66. United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376, 385 (8th Cir. 1953).
67. 9 U.S.C.'§ 1 (1952). See text at notes 73-76 infra.
68. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1952) (italics added).
69. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1952) (italics added)..
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that collective bargaining agreements are within the exclusion and there-
fore will not grant a stay.7° The Third Circuit first held that the exclu-
sion clause was not a limitation upon Section 3,71 later held that the exclu-
sion clause prevented a stay,72 and now takes the position that the exclusion,
while it limits Section 3, excludes only the agreements of workers directly
engaged in commerce and not those of workers merely engaged in the pro-
duction of goods for commerce.73 The Sixth Circuit in 1942 held that the
Act did not apply to a suit by an individual employee for wages due,74 but
in 1954 the court held that the exclusion clause did not prevent the ap-
plication of the Act in a suit against a union for violation of a no-strike
clause.75 The court distinguished the earlier case by saying that the in-
dividual hiring contract was clearly a "contract of employment," but that
the collective bargaining contract in the later case was a "trade agreement"
and therefore outside the exclusion.76 This Circuit would therefore grant
a stay in suits for violation of the general provisions of the contract, and
deny a stay in a suit by an employee. It seems probable that this court
will also deny a stay where the union brings the suit on behalf of the
individual employee.
77
Other circuits have been noncommital. Although the Tenth Circuit
has not considered the effect of the exclusion clause in stay proceedings, the
court stated that the Arbitration Act was inapplicable in holding an arbitra-
tion award invalid,78 citing two cases which held that the exclusion clause
70. United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Products, 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir.
1954) ; International Union, United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Floor-
ing Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948).
71. Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 777 (1946) ; Donahue v. Susquehanna, Collieries Co., 160 F.2d 661 (3d Cir.
1947); Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F2d 970 (3d Cir. 1948).
72. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Em-
ployees, 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952); Amdlgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951).
73. Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir.
1953).
74. Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944).
75. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, AFL 217 F.2d 49 (6th
Cir. 1954).
76. Id. at 52. Although the earlier case had been relied upon by other circuits
as holding that collective bargaining agreements were within the exclusion, see,
e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951); International Union, United Furniture Workers v.
Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948), the Hoover court says
of these cases: "We think these misconstrue the Gatliff holding." Hoover Motor
Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, AFL supra at 52.
77. Cf. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 210 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 75 Sup. Ct. 488 (1955). Although it
would seem that the suit remains the same no matter whether an employee or a
union is the party plaintiff, it is still possible that such a suit will be held to be one
on the collective bargaining agreement, for, as pointed out by the Third Circuit,
interpretations of the Arbitration Act are based on "policy considerations peculiar
to the Arbitration Act. . . ." Id. at 626 n.10.
78. Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, CIO, 187 F.2d 980,
981 (10th Cir. 1951).
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prevented a stay 79 and one case holding the exclusion not applicable to
stays.80 Since no court has applied to labor contracts the Arbitration Act
provisions for judicial confirmation of arbitration awards, neither the hold-
ing nor the conflicting citations indicate the course which will be taken in a
case involving stay proceedings. The Second Circuit, in rejecting a union's
contention that a no-strike clause was invalid because it was imbedded in
an unenforceable arbitration clause, stated that the Act was inapplicable
to collective bargaining agreements.81 In a later case the court, while ex-
pressly declining to consider the availability of a stay under the Act, denied
the stay on the merits; 82 and one of its district courts has interpreted this
case as an indication that the Second Circuit will grant a stay.83 In affirm-
ing a verdict for the plaintiff, the Eighth Circuit assumed that a stay was
available after pointing out that defendant had failed to ask for one.
84 If
the fine distinctions drawn in the Third and Sixth Circuits are any criteria
of judicial attitude toward arbitration clauses, it would seem that those
circuits which have not yet ruled will grant a stay where, in accordance
with Section 3, the issue is an arbitrable one.
Despite the fact that stays are considered remedial,85 and therefore are
controlled by the law of the forum 86 even if there is no substantive content
to Section 301 (a), those courts which have ruled upon motions for a stay
in 301 suits have disposed of the motions without considering whether the
Section itself could be construed as containing authorization to grant the
stay. In Textile Workers, CIO v. American Thread Co. 87 the court read
301 (a) as containing an implication of intent to establish specific per-
formance of an agreement to arbitrate as a nationally available remedy, and
79. International Union, United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Floor-
ing Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948), and the subsequently limited Sixth Circuit
Case, Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1942).
80. Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 777 (1946).
81. Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806, 809
(2d Cir. 1950). For this proposition, the court cited International Union, United
Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948).
See text at note 70 supra.
82. Markel Elec. Products, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 202 F.2d 435 (2d
Cir. 1953). One district court has granted a stay, Lewittes & Sons v. United Furni-
ture Workers, CIO, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (collective bargaining
agreement not a "contract of employment"), and another has compelled arbitration
by a grant of a preliminary injunction, Textile Workers Union, CIO v. Aleo Mfg.
Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C. 1950).
83. See Local 207, United Elec. Workers v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 119 F.
Supp. 877, 879 (D. Conn. 1954).
84. See United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376, 385 (8th Cir.
1953).
85. See Textile Workers, CIO v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 139-42
(D. Mass. 1953); see text at note 87 infra. In Markel Elec. Products, Inc. v.
United Elec. Workers, 202 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1953), which affirmed a denial of a
stay on the merits, Clark, J., dissenting, stated: "An agreement [to arbitrate] can
be enforced without regard to the . . . Arbitration Act." Id. at 438.
86. Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3, 6 (3d Cir. 1943);
Agostini Bros.' Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854, 856 (4th Cir. 1944).
See Comment, 102 U. OF PA. L. REv. 558, 560 (1954).
87. 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
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this theory would at least arguably support a grant of a stay without specific
statutory authority. Any intent read into Section 301 would be equally
present where the arbitration clause is used defensively rather than offen-
sively. In addition, there can be no valid ground for denying a stay where
the defendant can accomplish the same result by a counterclaim for an order
compelling arbitration.8 8
It is impossible to state with any degree of certainty why, in the light
of the Anerican Thread reasoning, consideration of the availability of au-
thority to grant the stay has still been confined to the Arbitration Act; but
several possible explanations can be advanced. With the interpretation of
the Arbitration Act in a state of flux, it is easier to expand its coverage than
to adopt a theory which relies upon an intent which is conceded to have only
meager support from the legislative history. 9 The vacillations of the
Third90 and Sixth Circuits 91 amply demonstrate this proposition. The
Third Circuit in its latest case recognized American Thread as a "well con-
sidered" opinion, but stated that its own conclusion that Section 3 was
available made it unnecessary to consider whether the defendant would have
been entitled to a stay under Section 301(a) .92 Those cases which denied
a stay after American Thread involved arbitration clauses which the courts
considered inapplicable to the issue tried,9 3 and consequently there was no
necessity to explore the possibility of finding some authority to grant the
stay. In addition, most movants rely solely upon Section 3, and courts
naturally deny the stay after holding that Section 3 does not apply 94 with-
out ruling upon arguments which the movant did not make. The Fourth
Circuit, in reaffirming its position that Section 3 does not authorize a stay,
both expressly restricted its discussion to the Arbitration Act and held the
issue not arbitrable. 95 The common-law rule would preclude granting a
stay, 6 and therefore these courts are justified in requiring some statutory
88. Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Columbia Typographical Union, 124 F.
Supp. 322 (D.D.C. 1954).
89. See Textile Workers, CIO v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 141
(D. Mass. 1953).
90. See text at notes 71-73 supra.
91. See text at notes 74-77 supra.
92. Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United -Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 454 (3d
Cir. 1954).
93. United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224
(4th Cir. 1954); Square D Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 123 F. Supp. 776, 782
(E.D. Mich. 1954).
94. Ludlow Mfg. & Sale Co. v. Textile Workers, CIO, 108 F. Supp. 45 (D. Del.
1952); Boston & Maine Transp. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees,
106 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1952); cf. International Union, United Furniture
Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948) (issue
not arbitrable); Metal Polishers, AFL v. Rubin, 85 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1949)
(issue not arbitrable).
95. United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th
Cir. 1954).
96. One of the corollaries of the common-law doctrine of revocability is the
rule that the bringing of the suit without resort to arbitration constitutes a revocation
by act. See Sturges & Murphy, Sone Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration
under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 580, 581 n.2
(1952); Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. OF PA. L.
Rxv. 160, 162 (1934).
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authority to reverse the rule; but since they did not consider the possibility
that Section 301(a) might supply this authority they do not support the
proposition that such authority cannot be found there. The question must
therefore be treated as an open one, and its answer will depend upon much
the same factors as determine the specific enforceability of arbitration
agreements. In view of the readiness of the courts to compel arbitration 9 7
and expand the coverage of Section 3, it appears that reliance upon Sec-
tion 301 (a) where the Arbitration Act is not available would not be
misplaced.
The questions presented when a party to a collective bargaining agree-
ment seeks to compel the other to submit an issue to arbitration in accord-
ance with the terms of the agreement differ from those presented by a
motion for a stay in two important respects: the Arbitration Act is not
available, and the strictures of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 98 must be
avoided. The Arbitration Act cannot be relied upon because Section 4,
which provides for an order to compel arbitration, is limited to those cases
which are included within Section 2, 99 whereas Section 3 is not; it is there-
fore necessary to look elsewhere for a basis of enforceability. This form
of relief also encounters the restrictions on the issuance of injunctions while
a stay does not.
Textile Workers, CIO v. American Thread Co.,'00 the leading case
holding that specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate is available
under Section 301 (a), furnishes a convenient basis for discussion of these
two problems. After avoiding a choice between state and federal law on
the theory that an agreement to arbitrate, although revocable and unen-
forceable, was valid under both, Judge Wyzanski held that specific en-
forcement was remedial, and that Section 301 (a) contemplated that the
remedies of the parties should be determined by federal law and should in-
clude the remedy of specific enforcement. The characterization of the
specific enforcement aspect as remedial, while well substantiated by similar-
holdings in a variety of situations,"°" avoids a determination of the substan-
tive content of 301 but does not obviate the necessity of looking to that
section for authority to overturn the common-law rule that executory agree-
ments to arbitrate are not enforceable.10 2  The legislative history is, as
97. See text following note 113 infra.
98. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1952).
99. "A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce. . . ." 9 U.S.C. §2 (1952) ; Tejas Development
Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1948); Watkins v. Hudson Coal
Co., 54 F. Supp. 953 (M.D. Pa. 1944); see Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v.
Westchester Service Corp., 70 F.2d 297, 298 (2d Cir. 1934) ; see Sturges & Murphy,
supra note 96, at 601; Comment, 102 U. OF PA. L. REv. 558-60 (1954).
100. 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
101. See Sturges & Murphy, supra note 96, at 587-98.
102. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTS § 550 (1932); Sturges & Murphy,
supra note 96, at 581 n,2; Simpson, s-upra note 96, at 162; Wolaver, The Historical
Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 132 (1934); Note,
Arbitration of Labor Contract Interpretation Disputes, 43 ILL. L. REv. 678, 679-80
(1948).
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elsewhere, less than clear on this point. Sections 8(a) (6) and 8(b) (5)
of the Senate amendment to the original House Bill made it an unfair labor
practice for an employer or representative "to violate the terms of a col-
lective bargaining agreement or the terms of an agreement to submit a labor
dispute to arbitration;" 103 but the House conference report explains the
omission only with the statement that "enforcement of the contract should
be left to the usual processes of the law and not of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board." 104 Little support can be gained from this statement, since
the usual processes of the law did not include specific enforcement, 10 5 and
since the effect of the omission is to remove the agreement from the Board's
broader enforcement powers. If Congress did manifest an intent to make
collective bargaining agreements generally enforceable, 0 6 it would seem
that the arbitration clause should partake of this enforceability. The fact
that the amendment treated the collective bargaining agreement and agree-
ments to arbitrate in the same manner indicates that arbitration should be
as enforceable as the remainder of the contract in which it is included.
The common-law doctrine "rests on merely weak historical arguments" 107
and the passage of Section 301(a) should be sufficient to overturn it.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act is a more formidable barrier. The Amer-
ican Thretd case said merely that the Act's structure, purposes and legis-
lative history show that it has no application to an injunction compelling
arbitration in accordance with a voluntary agreement; 108 the court placed
special reliance upon Section 8, which bars injunctions to any party "who
has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such disputes either
by negotiation . . or voluntary arbitration."' 0o9 However, this section
merely makes resort to voluntary arbitration a condition precedent and
does not purport to permit an injunction compelling it. The rejected
Senate amendment to the Labor-Management Relations Act clearly recog-
nizes that an order to compel arbitration involved a "labor dispute"; it used
the phrase "submission of a labor dispute to arbitration," and "labor dis-
pute" is defined in the LMRA almost exactly as it is in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act." 0 Despite the fact that a literal interpretation of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act would prevent the issuance of an injunction com-
103. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 8(a) (6), 8(b) (5) (1947).
104. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947).
105. See note 102 mipra. Moreover, this same statement and omission is often
relied upon as an indication of an intent not to expand the powers of the courts in
suits for injunction.
106. See text at notes 25-32 supra.
107. Textile Workers, CIO v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 142
(D. Mass. 1953); see Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d
978, 982-85 (2d Cir. 1942); Wolaver, The Historical Background of Cominercia2
Arbitration, 83 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 132, 138-42 (1934).
108. 113 F. Supp. 137, 142 (D. Mass. 1953).
109. 47 STAT. 72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1952).
110. 47 STAT. 72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1952). The NLRA definition adds
the word "tenure" to the Norris-La Guardia Act's ". . . terms or conditions of
employment . . ." 49 STAT. 450 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 137 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 152(9) (1952).
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pelling arbitration,111 this situation presents the most appealing case for
the adoption of a less literal view." 2  If arbitration cannot be secured
through legal sanctions, a party must either enforce its demands through
economic sanctions, or capitulate. Issuance of the order compelling arbitra-
tion offers an additional opportunity to avoid resort to strikes and lockouts
by providing an alternative peaceful method of securing recognition of the
demands. The resultant arbitration award, when coupled with public
opinion and the high rate of compliance with arbitrators' decisions, fur-
nishes an additional deterrent to economic action on the part of the loser.
The weaker party will be protected, since the availability of the courts will
remove the need for capitulation in the face of superior economic strength.
Nor does the issuance of the order contravene the Norris-LaGuardia Act's
policy of reducing judicial interference in labor relations. Invocation of the
courts actually will lessen this interference because the merits of a contro-
versy will be determined by the arbitrator rather than by a judge in any
later proceeding where the issue might be litigated."
3
Other cases decided under Section 301 (a) show that there is a strong
trend toward permitting specific enforcement of arbitration clauses. The
first case so holding " 4 saw no need to discuss the common-law rule of non-
enforceability. After rejecting defendant's contention that the state rule
applied, the court based its power to enforce the clause on the theory that
the relief was available as a federal remedy under Section 301(a). It then
avoided the Norris-LaGuardia Act by holding that the Act was not ap-
plicable in suits against employers.1 Later cases have ordered arbitra-
tion either without discussing the effect of the Norris-LaGuardia Act:""
or in reliance upon American Thread.117 In Local 207, United Elec.
Workers v. Landers, Frary & Clark 118 the court weighed the desirability
of arbitration in place of economic sanctions, the Norris-La-Guardia policy
111. The courts assume that an order compelling arbitration is an injunction
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See, e.g., Textile Workers, CIO
v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626, 629 (M.D.N.C. 1950). The Act prohibits a"restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction. . . ." 47 STAT. 70, 72
(1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 108 (1952). Specific enf6rcement of contracts is
treated as injunctive also.
112. See Comment, The Specific Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments under § 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 21 U. OF Cmr. L. Ray. 251, 264 (1954).
113. E.g., as a defense to a suit for damages under § 301 (a) where the party
resorts to economic sanctions to enforce his demands.
114. Textile Workers, CIO v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C.
1950).
115. This interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act appears to be unwarranted.
See Comment, supra note 112, at 263. See text at notes 166-73 infra.
116. Insurance Agents' Intl Union, AFL v. Prudential Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp.
869 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (enforceable under state law) ; Local 397, United Automobile
Workers, CIO v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 120 F. Supp. 228 (D. Conn. 1953) (the only
issue was whether an arbitrable question was presented).
117. Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Columbia Typographical Union, 124 F.
Supp. 322 (D.D.C. 1954) (by way of a counterclaim) ; cf. Industrial Trades Union
v. Woonsocket Dyeing Co., 122 F. Supp. 872 (D.R.I. 1954) (enforcement denied
on the merits but power to enforce assumed).
118. 119 F. Supp. 877 (D. Conn. 1954).
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of preventing compulsion and judicial interference, and Section 301 (a)'s
purpose of increasing the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements,
and concluded that it possessed the power to order arbitration. Two cir-
cuits have noted that their decisions on a motion for a stay did not preclude
the possibility that they might grant specific enforcement,"19 while a third
has indicated agreement with the proposition that such relief would not
violate the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia ActY1 0 In view of the
district court holdings and the circuit court dicta, it appears that Section
301 (a) jurisdiction may be successfully utilized as a method of obtaining
the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate.
If the arbitration clause is relied upon for purposes other than as the
basis of a motion for a stay or of a suit to compel arbitration, the result
becomes even less predictable. Depending upon the nature of the arbitra-
tion award and the form which a noncompliance assumes, it often will be
impossible for a court to enforce the award without directly contravening
the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Effective enforcement with-
out some form of injunctive relief can be achieved only if the award is
limited to a decision that money is due.' 21 A declaration of the rights
of the parties, including a determination of the validity of an award,
is available under Section 301 (a) 122 and the Declaratory Judgment ActM2
but this of itself can exert only moral pressure toward acceptance of the
award. It may, however, be useful in litigation concerning issues other
than validity alone. The declaration is conclusive upon the parties and
would thereby provide the defense of a prior breach in a suit for damages
against a victorious party who resorts to economic action to enforce com-
pliance with the award, while a declaration of invalidity would preclude
such a defense and also enable a party to ignore the award without in-
curring liability under Section 301(a).
One court has been willing to go so far as to hold the Norris-
LaGuardia Act inapplicable in ordering reinstatement of an employee in
accordance with an arbitrator's award; 14 but none has yet enjoined union
119. The Third Circuit, in holding that a stay was available under the Arbitration
Act, cited American Thread as a "well considered" opinion. Tenney Engineering,
Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F2d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 1953). The Fourth Circuit,
in denying a stay on the alternating grounds that the issue was not arbitrable and
that the Arbitration Act did not apply, expressly limited its decision on the latter point
to the Arbitration Act alone, stating: "Nor do we decide that such agreements to
arbitrate may not be specifically enforced." United Elec. Workeri v. Miller Metal
Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954).
120. W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 217 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1954).
The court held that enjoining of a strike in breach of such an agreement was
forbidden, citing the American Thread case for the proposition that equitable relief
not contrary to the act was within § 301(a). Id. at 9.
121. Cf. United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th
Cir. 1952) (injunction against operation of compulsory retirement plan denied because
of adequate remedy at law).
122. See, e.g., Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, CIO, 187
F2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951).
123. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1952).
124. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers Union v. Gillespie Milk Products Corp., 203
F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1953).
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non-compliance which took the form of a strike to enforce its demands.
Issuance of an injunction in the latter case could be justified only on the
theory either that any breach of a contract is not a labor dispute or that
Section 301(a) has repealed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, for there is no
reason to treat non-compliance with an award any differently than other
breaches of contract.
125
In other situations the wording of the clause will determine whether
it can be invoked successfully as a defense. Defendants in suits for violation
of a no-strike clause usually have been unsuccessful in contending that the
suit involves an issue referrable to arbitration. Where the provision is for
arbitration of disputes, differences, disagreements, grievances, or other
similar terms as the last step in the grievance procedure, the clause is held
not to apply to any issue involved in the suit on the theory that the clause
covers only those controversies suitable for settlement at the lower levels
of the grievance procedure and not claims for damages; 126 and where the
arbitration clause is in juxtaposition to the no-strike clause the former is
held inapplicable on the theory that the claim for violation is not arbitrable
under a contract designed to prevent the violation.12 7  However, Lewittes
& Sons v. United Furniture Workers, CIO 128 demonstrates that an ap-
propriately worded provision can be effectively utilized defensively in a suit
for violation of a no-strike clause. In that case the court reasoned that
the placement of the clause at the head of the grievance procedure indicated
an intent not to limit the clause to grievances, and that the inclusion of
the words "disputes arising out of or relating to this agreement, or the
breach thereof" m indicated an intent that claims for damages be arbitrated
rather than litigated.
The above courts approached the problem of the effect of an arbitra-
tion clause upon a suit for violation of the contract as a question of whether
125. This proposition is immediately apparent where the arbitrator is confined
by the contract to interpreting and applying the terms of the contract; a valid de-
cision is an application of the contract to a particular set of facts, and a refusal to
act in conformity with the decision is therefore nothing more than a breach of the
terms of the contract itself. Even where the umpire has the power to add to the
terms of the contract, it is impossible to draw a line between enforcement of the
award and a suit on the contract. This point is illustrated by United Shoe Workers
v. Le Danne Footwear, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1949), in which the union
sued the employer for failure to pay wage increases in accordance with the terms
of an oral agreement to accept the award rendered by the state board in a proceeding
involving the union and other employers.
126. United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 223
(4th Cir. 1954); Markel Elec. Products, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 202 F2d
435, 437 (2d Cir. 1953) ; International Union, United Furniture Workers v. Colonial
Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Harris Hub Bed Spring
Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 121 F. Supp. 40 (M.D. Pa. 1954) ; see Square D Co.
v. United Elec. Workers, 123 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Mich. 1954); Metal Polishers
Union, AFL v. Rubin, 85 F. Supp. 363, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1949); cf. Hoover Motor
Ezpress Co. v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 217 F.2d 49, 53 (6th Cir. 1954).
127. See International Union, United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood
Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1948); Harris Hub Bed Spring Co. v.
United Elec. Workers, 121 F. Supp. 40, 42 (M.D. Pa. 1954); Metal Polishers
Union, AFL v. Rubin, 85 F. Supp. 363, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
128. 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
129. Id. at 854 (italics added).
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or not the claim for relief itself was intended to be arbitrated. This
approach is improper because it might in many cases result in the court's
making an interpretation, necessary to a decision on the merits of the suit,
of an issue which the parties intended should be determined by the arbi-
trator. The court which refuses to refer the entire suit to arbitration
necessarily will have to interpret the no strike clause, for example, to deter-
mine whether it is in effect,130 whether the strike is "authorized," 131 or
whether there has been a prior breach by the employer which might justify
the strike.13 2 Where the agreement is to submit to arbitration all questions
of interpretation, the court which decides these questions in a suit for dam-
ages, and thus refuses to dismiss or stay pending arbitration because the
claim for damages is not arbitrable, has undertaken to interpret the con-
tract and thereby replace the arbitrator.
The effect of the arbitration clause is also important where the union
defends on the theory that the employer's refusal to arbitrate is a breach
which excuses what would otherwise be a violation of the no-strike obliga-
tion. Whether this defense should be upheld as a matter of the federal law
of labor contracts may well depend upon whether an order compelling
arbitration is available to the union as an alternative method of enforcing
its demands. If the order can be had a court might require that this step
be taken before the strike is called; if an order is unavailable, the strike is
the only way in which the union can secure the employer's compliance.
Whether the terms of the contract restrict the no-strike clause to un-
provoked strikes will depend upon the interpretation of that clause, which
under the assumed arbitration clause is to be determined by the arbitrator.
Where, on the other hand, the union has failed-or refused to arbitrate the
meaning of the arbitration provision, the validity of the union's demands
under a correct interpretation of the contract are not involved. Under these
circumstances the merits of the controversy which precipitated the breach
are irrelevant in the suit for damages.'-3  Since the extent to which it is the
130. See, e.g., Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers Union, CIO, 108
F. Supp. 45 (D. Del. 1952), in which the court rejected the union's contention that the
contract, which contained a reopening clause suspending the no-strike obligation, per-
mitted a strike before the expiration of the 30-day period after the opening. The
court, after denying a motion for a stay, interpreted the contract as precluding strikes
until after 30 days. Id. at 50. See also Markel Elec. Products, Inc. v. United Elec.
Workers, 202 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1953).
131. See, e.g., Square D Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 123 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.
Mich. 1954), in which the court, interpreting the arbitration clause as including only
employee grievances, stated that even if the paragraph making arbitration the ex-
clusive remedy for violations referred to in the preceding section, which absolved the
union from liability for unauthorized strikes, there was no arbitrable issue because the
complaint alleged an authorized strike. Id. at 783.
132. See, e.g., Morrison v. Local 682, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, AFL, 114
F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Ky. 1953), in which the court issued a judgment declaring that
a certain person was not an "employee!' within the meaning of the contract. The
company had refused to arbitrate the union demand that as an employee he was
required to pay dues, and the union struck. The court did not even discuss the
effect of the arbitration clause or the plaintiff's refusal to arbitrate. The company's
suit for an injunction against the strike was remanded to the state court. Id. at 55.
133. Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806
(2d Cir. 1950).
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proper function of a court to interpret the contract in a 301 suit will be
controlled by the contract, the parties should take care to express their
intent if they desire that this function be performed by an arbitrator. This
can be accomplished either by proper wording of the arbitration clause, in
which case some risk is run that a particular court might avoid their desires
by holding that the arbitration act stay provisions are inapplicable, or by
restricting the no-strike clause itself so that a determination by an arbi-
trator that a breach has occurred is a condition precedent to liability fo
damages. Section 301 (a), in increasing the possibility that one of the
parties will be subjected to liability for its breaches under a court's inter-
pretation of the contract, makes these problems more worthy of attention
during the negotiation of the contract.
AVAILABLE RELIEF
The language of Section 301(a) does not set any limits on the type
of relief which the district courts can render in "suits for violation of
contracts." :14 Both the use of the unlimited word "suits" and a com-
parison with Section 303(b), which limits recovery for violation of the
secondary boycott provisions to the damages sustained, 35 show that the
broader language of Section 301(a) comprehends more than just suits
for money judgments. No court has doubted that the grant includes
jurisdiction over suits for damages, and suits for declaratory ' 36 and in-
junctive 1- 7 relief frequently have been entertained. Of the decisions re-
fusing to take jurisdiction of suits for equitable relief, all but one have
been predicated upon the existence of restrictions found elsewhere, 138
rather than upon any deficiency in the jurisdictional grant. Thus, the
courts have indicated that Section 301(a) itself contains no limitations
upon the types of relief which may be obtained in the suits which it permits.
The sole case to the contrary is International Longshoremen's Union
v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 39 which dismissed a union's suit for an in-
134. Compare H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(a) (1947). "Any action for
or proceeding involving a violation. . . ." The difference in language between this
original House Bill and the Act as passed is not commented upon, and it would there-
fore appear that no substantial change was either intended or effected.
135. "Whoever shall be injured in his business or property . . . may sue there-
for in any district court of the United States . . . and shall recover the damages
by him sustained and the cost of the suit." 61 STAT. 159 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b)
(1952).
136. AFL v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1950); Morrison
v. Shopmen's Union, AFL, 114 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Ky. 1953); Studio Carpenters
Union v. Loew's, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 675 (S.D. Cal. 1949); see United Protective
Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997, 1000 (7th Cir. 1952). Other courts have
taken jurisdiction over suits for declaratory judgment without commenting upon the
declaratory relief requested. See, e.g., Modine Mfg. Co. v. Grand Lodge Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists, 216 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Textile Workers, CIO v. Arista Mills
Co., 193 F2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951); United Steel Workers, CIO v. Shakespeare Co.,
84 F. Supp. 267 (W.D. Mich. 1949).
137. See cases cited notes 159-71 infra.
138. Either by the Norris-LaGuardia Act or by § 10(a) of the NLRA, 61
STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1952) (giving the NLRB jurisdiction over
unfair labor practices).
139. 114 F. Supp. 249 (D. Hawaii 1953).
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junction and a declaration of the rights of the parties under the contract
and, on petition for a new trial, 1' ° held that Section 301(a) conferred no
jurisdiction over the suit for declaratory relief alone. For support of its
basic proposition that the section includes only suits for damages, the
court relied upon its opinion in a prior case, 41 which remanded an em-
ployer's suit for an injunction against a strike in breach of the contract.
The prior opinion held that Section 301(a) had not repealed the Norris-
LaGuardia Act because congressional attention had been centered upon
money judgments. As part of its argument, the court cited three factors:
the lifting of the jurisdictional amount requirement, the 301(b) provision
limiting the effect of judgments against the union entity, and statements
of senatorial solicitude for the individual union member.' 42 However,
these factors do not support the denial of declaratory relief in the more
recent case. The elimination of the jurisdictional amount requirement
applies to every kind of suit otherwise permitted, and thus is irrelevant
to the issue of what relief is available. The limitation upon the effect of
money judgments and the statements pointing out the nonliability of the
individual are both natural concomitants of treating labor unions as in-
corporated bodies; and, since a suit for damages was among those per-
mitted, a specific provision was necessary to prevent the result in the
Danbury Hatters' cases, 14 in which individual union members were sub-
jected to heavy financial liability. Moreover, the fact that Congress failed
to advert to other types of relief leads to opposite conclusions in regard
to injunctions and declaratory judgments. The passage of a broadly
phrased jurisdictional grant in the presence of a statutory prohibition of
certain types of injunctions indicates that the prohibition remains un-
repealed, while such a grant in the presence of statutory allowance of
140. 115 F. Supp. 123 (D. Hawaii 1953).
141. Castle & Cooke Terminals v. Local 137, Int'l Longshoremen's Union,
110 F. Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953).
142. Senator Taft: "But the pending bill provides they can be sued as if they
were corporations and if a judgment is found against the labor organization, even
though it is an unincorporated association, the liability is on the labor union and
the labor-union funds, and it is not on the individual members of the union, where
it has fallen in some famous cases to the great financial distress of the individual
members of labor unions." 93 CONG. REc. 3955 (1947). Senator Smith: "[Title
III] requires that labor organizations, as well as employers, shall be responsible
for carrying out contracts legally entered into as the result of collective bargaining."
After quoting Justice Brandeis' statement that unions should make themselves
amenable to law, Senator Smith continued "I cannot see how anyone can take issue
with . . . [that] statement . . . or . . . with the provisions of title III, which
simply carry out the idea, by providing that whichever side is guilty of violating a
contract solemenly entered into shall be responsible for damages resulting from such
violation." 93 CoNG. REc. 4410 (1947). Senator Ball, arguing that the bill benefited
employees, stated that employers already had a right to sue unions subject to pro-
cedural difficulties, "and, if a judgment is rendered, it holds every member liable for
the judgment.
"The pending measure, by providing that the union may sue and be sued as a
legal entity, for a violation of contract, and that liability for damages will lie against
union assets only, will prevent a repetition of the Danbury Hatters case.
93 CONG. REc. 5146 (1947).
143. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (190); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522
(1915).
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declaratory relief 14 indicates that the latter is available. The conclusion
of the Libby court therefore must bow to the weight of authority and to
the reasoning of Studio Carpenters Union v. Loew's, Inc.: 145
"Had Congress intended that the suits authorized by Sec. 301
should have been only suits for damages, it would have been a simple
thing to have included that word in the language of the Section.
There is no doubt that the language used in Sec. 301 includes suits
for damages, but does not exclude a suit for declaratory relief ... "
Most of the cases which have raised the question of available relief
under 301 (a) concern suits for an injunction against breach of the con-
tract. The answer depends upon the applicability of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, which deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin
several enumerated types of conduct in cases "involving or growing put
of" labor disputes,' 46 and establishes strict prerequisites for an injunction
in all other labor dispute cases.14 7 Although state courts and commen-
tators have argued that suits for breach of labor contracts should not be
considered within the scope of the Act,148 the federal courts have con-
sistently relied upon it to deny injunctions in such suits.' 49 The enact-
ment of Section 301(a) conceivably might have been held to relieve such
injunctions from the Norris-LaGuardia ban on the theory that, since both
operate on a jurisdictional level,'6 0 the later grant restored the jurisdiction
previously withheld. Legislative history, however, compels the opposite
conclusion. A provision in the House Bill expressly exempting suits for
violation of contract '6 ' from the Norris-LaGuardia Act was deleted in
144. 28 U.S.C. §8 2201, 2202 (1952).
145. 84 F. Supp. 675, 676 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
146. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §104 (1952).
147. 47 STAT. 71, 72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 107-09 (1952).
148. See Rice, A Paradox of Our National Labor Law, 34 MARQ. L. REV.
233 (1951); Note, Specific Performance of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 37
VA. L. REv. 739 (1951); Comment, 21 U. OF Cl. L. REV. 251 (1954).
149. W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 217
F2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954); In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 192 F.2d 971 (2d
Cir. 1951); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, 173 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1949), affirming
81 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Sound Lumber Co. v. Lumber & Sawmill
Workers Union, 122 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Local 937, International
Union, United Automobile Workers, CIO v. Royal Typewriter Co., 88 F. Supp.
669 (D. Conn. 1949) ; Duris v. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 87 F. Supp.
229 (D.N.J. 1949); Colorado-Wyoming Express v. Denver Local 13, Int'l Brother-
hood of Teamsters, AFL, 35 F. Supp. 155 (D. Colo. 1940); Wilson & Co. v. Birl,
27 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Pa. 1939), aff'd, 105 F.2d 948 (3rd Cir. 1939). The Supreme
Court has indicated agreement; see United States v. United Mine Workers, 330
U.S. 258, 270, 312 (1947); Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Co., 311
U.S. 91, 100-03 (1940), and Congress understood this position to be the law, see
SEN. RE,. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947).
150. See 47 STAT. 70, 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. 88 101, 104, 105, 107 (1952). Section
101 provides: "No court of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction. . . ."; 29 U.S.C.
§ 102 provides: ". . . in determining the jurisdiction and authority of the courts
of the United States . . . the public policy of the United States is declared as
follows ... "
151. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §302(e) (1947).
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the Senate, as was the Senate provision subjecting such violations to in-
junction as unfair practices. 15 2 Congress thought a mere grant of juris-
diction inappropriate and insufficient to effectuate an exception to the
injunction statute,15 3 and in other circumstances where injunctive relief
was considered desirable the Norris-LaGuardia Act was expressly made
applicable.' 54  Senator Taft assessed the temper of the Senate as being
strongly against restoration of the injunction as a weapon in the hands of
private parties.tm In addition, the canon that repeals by implication are
not favored has particular validity when applied to this situation, where
"the earlier enactment is a significant and tremendously important piece
of legislation which the Congress evidently had specifically in mind
.. . P 16 These factors compel the conclusion that the passage of Sec-
tion 301(a) was not intended to reduce in any way the vitality of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, and every court which has considered the opposite con-
tention has rejected it.15
7
Despite the fact that no court has expressly disagreed with these
holdings, Section 301 (a) has resulted in a relaxation of the restrictions on
injunctions by federal holdings that the Act never applied, rather than
that 301 (a) has rendered it inapplicable. Many courts have taken the
occasion presented by a suit under the section to grant injunctive relief
even though the case would seem to involve a "labor dispute." This is a
tenuous result, however, because violation of any contractual provision
152. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §§8(a) (6), 8(b) (5) (1947).
153. Senator Taft, in discussing a proposed amendment to § 303 which would
give federal courts "jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations" of § 303 in
certain cases, stated: "I really do not think . . . [that] amendment to give juris-
diction, without any reference to the Norris-LaGuardia Act . . . is in any way
changing the legal situation of those who are injured under those circumstances."
93 CONG. REC. 5066 (1947). See also the remarks of Senator Ferguson, id. at 5067.
154. §510(h), (1), 61 STAT. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§160(h), (1)(1952)
(unfair practices); § 208(b), 61 STAT. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 178(b) (national
emergencies) ; § 302(e), 61 STAT. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1952) (payments
to employee representatives).
155. Senator Taft, in explaining his withdrawal of support from the Ball
Amendment which permitted injunctions against violations of § 303, stated: ". . . I
found that opposition to restoring the injunctive process even in cases of secondary
boycotts and jurisdictional strikes, seemed to be so strong, and I am so anxious to
retain . . . the right of direct action in suits brought for damages in cases of that
kind, ... that I shall vote against the Ball Amendment ... " 93 CONG.
REc. 5045 (1947).
156. W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 217
F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1954).
157. W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 217
F2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, 81 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y.
1948), aff'd per curiarn, 173 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Sound Lumber Co. v. Lumber
& Sawmill Workers Union, 122 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Duris v. Phelps
Dodge Copper Products Corp., 87 F. Supp. 229 (D.N.J. 1949); cf., in granting
petition for remand, Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Bayne, 124 F. Supp. 605
(W.D.S.C. 1954) ; Associated Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, CIO, 114 F. Supp.
334 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (alternate grounds) ; Castle & Cooke Terminals, Ltd. v. Local
137, Int'l Longshoremen's Union, 110 F. Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953); see Local
937, United Automobile Workers, CIO v. Royal Typewriter Co., 88 F. Supp. 669
(D. Conn. 1949); cf. California Ass'n of Employers v. Building & Construction
Trades Council, 178 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1949).
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governing terms or conditions of employment necessarily involves a con-
troversy over them, and any suit alleging such a violation would therefore
be within the broad definitions of Section 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.15 8  I I '
In those cases which grant injunctive relief, the courts have developed
three distinct approaches, all of which were conceived and applied in 301
suits. The first and least defensible is that of completely avoiding the
Act by relying upon prior cases which neither discussed nor purported
to involve the Act. The Sixth Circuit, in Milk & Ice Cream Drivers,
AFL v. Gillespie Milk Products Corp.,59 reversed the dismissal of a
union's suit for an injunction against the employer's breach, which con-
sisted of a refusal to reinstate an employee in accordance with an arbi-
trator's award. The court summarily rejected the employer's contention
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act forbade the injunction by citing its de-
cision in American Federation of Labor v. Western Union Tel. Co.' 6o and
stating "Although the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not under discussion,
our opinion carried the necessary implication that the Act did not forbid
the granting of the character of relief prayed." I61 The Western Union
case in fact carried no such implication,'8 2 for it merely reversed the dis-
missal of a suit not only for an injunction but also for a declaratory judg-
ment that an employee was entitled to a pension, and the court confined
its discussion of the available relief to the statement that "the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act vests in the federal court the right to grant
the character of relief prayed." 168 The Gillespie reliance upon the
Western Union case is nothing more than a refusal to face the problem.
Another approach, adopted in the American Thread case' 6 4 in com-
pelling submission of a dispute to arbitration, is that of holding that the
Act was not intended to apply to the situation at hand. This approach
has the advantage of resulting in a reasoned decision, since it requires
inquiry into the intent and purposes of the Act and the application of
current labor policies to the particular case.16
Another theory used to permit injunctions in 301 suits is that of re-
fusing to apply the Norris-LaGuardia Act to suits against employers. This
theory first appeared in Mountain States Div. No. 17, Communication
Workers v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,166 in which the court en-
joined an employer from terminating a collective bargaining agreement.
158. 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1952).
159. 203 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1953).
160. 179 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1950).
161. 203 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 1953).
162. See Associated Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334, 338
(S.D. Cal. 1953).
163. 179 F2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1950).
164. 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
165. See text at notes 108-09 supra.
166. 81 F. Supp. 397 (D. Colo. 1948).
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The court stated that "there is no labor dispute, no strike, fighting, violence
or failure on the part of the local authorities to maintain order . . .
[which are] the evils the Norris-LaGuardia Act was intended to protect
the individual workman from." 1 67 This dubious reasoning was apparently
advanced to support the court's otherwise untenable conclusion that the
case did not involve a labor dispute.
The theory next appeared in a case compelling arbitration,1 68 and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was avoided by the proposition that this relief was
not forbidden by Section 4 because that section was a limitation on behalf
of employees.1 69 The court then granted the injunction, stating that the
requirements of the Norrris-LaGuardia Act had been met. However, the
required findings of fact were not even attempted, and the facts given
show no possible basis for such a finding.170 Another court later denied
summary judgment for defendant in a suit to compel arbitration because it
doubted that the Act applied to suits against employers.171 The court
apparently based its doubts on the above cases, although they were not
cited. Other courts have regarded this theory as sufficiently strong to
require the placing of a denial of an injunction against an employer on
grounds apart from the Norris-LaGuardia restrictions. 72  The theory does
not deserve the recognition which it has been given since it finds no sup-
port in the Act itself; 173 and even those courts which first adopted the
reasoning were unwilling to rely fully upon it.
Some cases have granted injunctive relief at the suit of a union with-
out discussion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act;174 others have denied relief
167. Id. at 400.
168. Textile Workers, CIO v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C.).
169. Id. at 629. Other sections of the Act were not discussed. The court dis-
tinguished the cases relied on by the employer on the grounds that they involved
suits against a union.
170. See Note, 21 U. oF CHi. L. REv. 251, 263-64.
171. Local 877, United Automobile Workers, CIO v. United Aircraft Corp., 120
F. Supp. 186, 188 (D. Conn. 1952). This court in later cases has preferred to base
its power to grant an order compelling arbitration upon an approach similar to that
of American Thread rather than upon the inapplicability of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to employers. Compare Local 207, United Elec. Workers v. Landers, Frary &
Clark, 119 F. Supp. 877 (D. Conn. 1954), Westh International Union of Mine
Workers v. American Brass Co., 126 F. Supp. 491, 493 (D. Conn. 1954).
172. In United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.
1952) the court affirmed the denial upon the ground that there was an adequate
remedy at law, after rejecting the lower court's reasoning that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act forbade the injunction, and after noting that the authorities were not in agree-
ment. Id. at 1001. Compare International Longshoremen's Union v. Libby, McNeill
& Libby, 114 F. Supp. 249, 251, new trial denied, 115 F. Supp. 123 (D. Hawaii 1953)
(§301(a) includes suits for damages only), wzith International Union of Mine
Workers v. American Brass Co., 126 F. Supp. 491, 504 (D. Conn. 1954) (pendency
of action in state court).
173. See Note, 21 U. oF Cm. L. Rxv. 250, 261-62 (1954).
174. Local 397, United Automobile Workers, CIO v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 120
F. Supp. 228 (D. Conn. 1953); Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, AFL v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
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on the merits,175 or because of the existence of an adequate remedy at
law,'7 6 or for mootness.
177
Those cases which hold that injunctive relief is prohibited also may
be classified. The first class consists of suits brought by the employer
for an injunction against breach of a no-strike clause 17 8 or against con-
certed refusal to work under the terms of the 'contract.17 9  Since this
employee activity is specifically protected by Section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 0 injunctive relief in these instances is clearly forbidden.
In the next group are those cases in which the injunctive relief was denied
in suits by the union against the employer. In Duris v. Phelps Dodge
Copper Products Corp.,'8s the national and local unions, having been
expelled from the CIO, sued for an injunction against the employer and
the newly formed CIO units to enjoin the defendants from applying to
the new units the check-off, recognition, and grievance clauses of the exist-
ing contract. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, holding that
the suit, being a controversy over which of the two unions should function
as the representative of the employees, was a "labor dispute" within the
terms of the Act.'8 2  In the case of United Packinghouse Workers v.
Wilson & Co.,'i 8 the court dismissed the union's suit for an injunction
against the employer's failure to abide by the contract during a strike
which was permitted by a re-opening clause. After finding that a "labor
dispute" was involved, the court reasoned that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
removed jurisdiction to grant the injunction and that neither the amend-
ments to Section 10 of the NLRA 18 nor Section 301 (a) had restored it.
Neither of these cases is directly opposed to those which state that the
175. Textile Workers, CIO v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951)
(enforcement of seniority rights); Bakery & Confectionery Workers v. National
Biscuit Co., 177 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1949) (against pension plan); Industrial Trades
Union v. Woonsocket Dyeing Co., 122 F. Supp. 872 (D.R.I. 1954) (submission to
arbitration).
176. United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.
1952) (pension plan); Local 937, United Automobile Workers, CIO v. Royal Type-
writer Co., 88 F. Supp. 669 (D. Conn. 1949) (breach of wage provisions).
177. Silverton v. Rich, 119 F. Supp. 434, 436 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (breach of union
shop and wage provisions).
178. W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954);
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Bayne, 124 F. Supp. 605 (W.D.S.C. 1954) (re-
manded); Sound Lumber Co. v. Sawmill Workers, 122 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal.
1954); Morrison v. Local 682, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, AFL, 114 F. Supp.
54 (W.D. Ky. 1953) (injunction remanded and declaratory judgment retained);
Castle & Cooke Terminals, Ltd. v. Local 137, Int'l Longshoremen's Union, 110 F.
Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953) (remanded; alternate holding).
179. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, 173 F.2d 567 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
821 (1949).
180. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §104 (1952).
181. 87 F. Supp. 229 (D.N.J. 1949).
182. "The term labor dispute includes any controversy . . . concerning the as-
sociation or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, [and] maintaining . . .
terms or conditions of employment. . . ." 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c)
(1952).
183. 80 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
184. 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1952).
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Norris-LaGuardia Act runs in favor of employees only, since the injunc-
tion sought in the former would have been against the other union, and
since the latter was also treated as alleging an unfair practice, over which
the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction.1'1
Although no consistent rationale can be drawn from the cases dealing
with injunctive relief under Section 301(a), two patterns are apparent:
(1) an order compelling an employer to submit to arbitration is available;
(2) injunctive relief against concerted employee activity is prohibited.
Certainly the second, and probably the first, of these patterns will be ad-
hered to in future cases.
It remains doubtful whether an injunction may be had in other sit-
uations, but there is a greater probability where the union is the plaintiff.
Despite the Sixth Circuit's issuance of an injunction at the behest of a
union and the absence of any denial in any other circuit, the Sixth Circuit
case should carry little weight, for it did not attempt to interpret the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. The federal appellate courts will probably hold
that Section 301 (a) did not override the injunction statute,8 0 but beyond
that point there is no authority or indication of what will be the result.
PROPER PARTIES
While it is clear that one essential element in the suits covered by
Section 301(a) is the assertion of a violation of contract, nothing in the
section or its legislative history limits such suits to those between the
parties to the contract.18 7  However, the principle that the grant includes
only suits between the parties to the contract sued upon has become firmly
established without exception by the decisions. Where the issue is the
propriety of parties plaintiff it is uniformly held that individual members
of the union may not bring suit under Section 301(a),188 and that a mem-
ber of an employer's association, being similarly situated, may not sue
on a contract between the association and the union.189 There is no
185. 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1952).
186. See text at note 157 and note 157 supra.
187. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 204
F.2d 495, 496 (3d Cir. 1953).
188. Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Columbia Typographical Union, 124 F.
Supp. 322 (D.D.C. 1954); Silverton v. Rich, 119 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1954);
see United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997, 1000 (7th Cir.
1952); Durkin v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 82 F. Supp. 893, 11 F.R.D.
147, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; Schatte v. International Alliance, 84 F. Supp. 669, 672
(S.D. Cal. 1949); Mackay v. Loew's Inc., 84 F. Supp. 676, 677 (S.D. Cal. 1949);
Reed v. Fawick Airflex Co., 86 F. Supp. 822, 824 (N.D. Ohio 1949); cf. Snoots
v. Wejlupek, 87 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
Several cases contain statements which indicate that an individual was perhaps
a party to the suit in addition to the plaintiff union. See Mercury Oil Refining Co.
v. Oil Workers, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951); International Union of Operating
Engineers v. William D. Baker Co., 100 F. Supp. 773, 774 (E.D. Pa. 1951); United
Steel Workers v. Shakespeare Co., 84 F. Supp. 267, 269 (W.D. Mich. 1949); cf.
United Packinghouse Workers v. Wilson Co., 80 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Ill. 1948)
(suit for injunction dismissed for want of jurisdiction).
189. Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers, 115 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1953).
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objection to the joinder of the individual's action, where independent
grounds for jurisdiction over it are present.' 9° The Third Circuit, in
holding for the defendant in a suit by the nonsignatory charterer of a ship
against a union which breached a contract with a stevedoring firn, 191 ex-
pressed some doubt as to the validity of the union's contention that only
parties to the contract could be plaintiffs under 301(a), and declined to
decide the case on that basis. However, the case which the court cited
as raising the doubt, a suit by an employee discharged in violation of a
collective bargaining agreement, 192 was not brought under the section but
under the general jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts.1' There
is no case holding that one not a party to a contract may sue for its
breach under Section 301(a). This rule was rendered largely academic
by the Supreme Court's decision in the Westinghouse case' 94 that Section
301(a) does not confer jurisdiction over suits under terms of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement which are peculiarly for the employees' benefit.
This rationale eliminates from the coverage of the section those suits in
which an individual is most likely to bring a suit, and in those cases which
remain its net effect is the substitution of the union's name for that of the
individual. The doctrine would still prevent a member of an employer
association from bringing suit on the association's contract.
The requirement that the suit be between parties to the contract is
also applied in determining the proper parties defendant. It has been held
that individuals and an international union may not be sued for breach
of a contract signed only by the local.195 Section 301(b), which provides
that "any money judgment against a labor organization . . . shall not
be enforceable against any individual member or his assets," 198 does not
control, for it governs only the effect of judgments against the organiza-
tion and would not prevent judgments against the individual; 19 nor
would it have any effect where a union is not a defendant or where the
suit is for relief other than a money judgment. One result of requiring
defendants to be parties to the contract is the elimination from the coverage
190. United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.
(1952). The employee's and union's causes must, of course, meet the requirements
of the Federal Rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
191. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 204 F.2d 495
(3d Cir. 1953).
192. Marrahzano v. Riggs Nat. Bank, 184 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
193. See Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers, 115 F. Supp. 802, 809-10 (E.D.
Ark. 1953).
194. 75 Sup. Ct. 488 (1955). See text at notes 205-16 infra.
195. Square D Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 123 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Mich.
1954) ; cf. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. v. International Union, United Furniture
Workers, 76 F. Supp. 493 (D. Md. 1948) (on motion to dismiss complaint as to
defendant International Union, issue of execution of contract by the International
Union left for determination on'the merits).
196. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 185(b) (1952).
197. Cf. Square D Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 123 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Mich.
1954), in which the court did not refer to §301(b) in dismissing a suit against the
individuals for money damages on the grounds that they were not parties to the
contract.
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of Section 301 (a) of actions based on a theory of conspiracy to breach
or of inducing a party to breach the contract. Those few courts which
have been faced with suits for interference with contractual relations have
held them not to be within the jurisdiction conferred. In Square D Co.
v. United Electrical Workers,19 8 the court dismissed a suit against a
nonsignatory international union after rejecting the plaintiff's contention
that the section included suits against those who conspired to breach the
contract. Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc. 9o denied a motion to
remand to the state court a suit against an employer and a nonsignatory
union which alleged in one count that the employer had breached the con-
tract with plaintiff union and in another count that the employer and
defendant union had conspired to breach the contract. The court stated
that the allegations did "advance essentially a claim founded on breach
of contract and . . . this . . . is not affected by the additional recitals
of conspiracy." 200 This dictum indicates that the court would not have
held a suit against a third party for the same conspiracy to be within
Section 301(a), and at any rate the case is not authority for the inclusion
of conspiracy actions since in removal cases the court may take jurisdic-
tion of nonfederal causes which are part of an otherwise removable suit.
20 1
In another case 2 02 a court took jurisdiction of a suit against two unions,
only one of which was a party to the contract, but apparently relied upon
both Sections 301(a) and 303(b),203 and the Square D case distinguished
it on this ground.2 04 Although these few cases alone cannot foreclose the
inclusion of such suits within Section 301(a), there is no reason to treat
the suits differently in this respect than those in which the requirement
is applied to plaintiffs, and the latter cases can therefore be relied upon.
In addition, the argument for excluding nonsignatory defendants is stronger
than that for excluding plaintiffs. The latter cases differ in that a plain-
tiff can rely upon some rights conferred upon him by the contract while
in the former the defendant is a stranger to the contract until he inter-
feres with its performance. A suit against a nonsignatory defendant is
more aptly described as a suit "for interference with contractual relations"
than as one for "violation of a contract."
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Association of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,205 the exclusion of
198. 123 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
199. 98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
200. Id. at 280.
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
202. F. 0. Stenzel & Co. v. Department Store Package Union, CIO, 11 F.R.D.
362 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
203. The court stated that § 301 "specifically provides for the institution and
maintenance of suits for violation of contracts . . . and [§ 303] is more specific
in relation to unlawful combinations. . . .". Id. at 363. The court nowhere
indicates that the picket lines of the non-contracting union were alleged to have been
established for any of the purposes which would make them actionable under § 303.
204. 123 F. Supp. 776, 781.
205. 75 Sup. Ct. 488 (1955).
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suits brought by the individual employee from the jurisdictional grant of
Section 301(a) had not prevented its utilization to protect an employee
against a breach of those provisions in the collective agreement which
inured to his benefit, for the courts permitted the union to bring the suit
on behalf of the injured employee. Without considering it necessary to
discuss the possibility that they might be exceeding the limits of Section
301 (a), courts accepted jurisdiction over suits in which the union as-
serted the employee's right to wages,206 retirement benefits,20 7 vacation
pay,20 8 and damages for breach of seniority rights.2 0 9 In the Westinghouse
case the union brought suit under Section 301(a) alleging that the em-
ployer's refusal to pay 4000 employees their wages for a day on which they
were absent from work was a violation of the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement then in effect. The union sought a declaratory judgment
interpreting the contract and judgments in favor of each employee. After
a dismissal on the merits by the district court,210 the Third Circuit dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the duty to pay an
employee arose from the individual contracts of hire and consequently the
complaint alleged a violation of the contracts between each employee and
the employer rather than a violation of the contract between the labor
organization and the employer. 2 l The Supreme Court, Justices Douglas
and Black dissenting, affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, holding
that the suit was not within the jurisdiction conferred by Section 301(a).
Each of the three opinions in support of dismissal is based upon the
recognition of a distinction between rights which, though determined by
provisions found within the collective agreement, are those of the individual
employees, ahd rights which pertain to the union entity; but no more than
three Justices could agree upon a rationale upon which the distinction is
to be made. Justice Reed adopted a rationale similar to that of the majority
of the Third Circuit.212  Chief Justice Warren, in a one paragraph opin-
ion in which Justice Clark joined, excludes the suit because "the language
206. Silverton v. Rich, 119 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Food Services
Trades Council v. Retail Associates, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Ohio 1953);
Lexington Federation of Tel. Workers v. Kentucky Tel. Corp., 11 F.R.D. 526
(E.D. Ky. 1951); Local 937, United Automobile Workers, CIO v. Royal Type-
writer Co., 88 F. Supp. 669 (D. Conn. 1949); United Shoe Workers v. LeDanne
Footwear, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1949).
207. AFL v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1950); ef. Textile
Workers, CIO. v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
208. Local 793, United Automobile Workers, CIO v. Auto Specialities Mfg.
Co., 15 F.R.D. 261 (W.D. Mich. 1951); United Automobile Workers v. Wilson
Athletic Goods Mfg. Co., 119 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
209. United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F2d 997 (7th Cir.
1952); Textile Workers, CIO v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951);
Bakery & Confectionery Workers v. National Biscuit Co., 177 F.2d 684 (3d Cir.
1949).
210. 107 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
211. 210 F.2d 623 (1954) (Biggs, CJ., Hastie and Kalodner, JJ., dissenting),
102 U. oF PA. L. REv. 815, 63 YAix L.J. 1173, 54 CoL. L. REv. 1003 (1954).
212. See text at note 211 u/Pra. Although the Third Circuit majority was not
explicitly relied upon, the language and reasoning of the opinion is substantially
similar.
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of § 301 (a) is not sufficiently explicit nor its legislative history sufficiently
clear to indicate that Congress intended to authorize a union to enforce
in a federal court the uniquely personal right of an employee... " 213
Since Congress manifestly contemplated that the union could be a plaintiff
in some Section 301 suits, the requirement of clearer and more explicit
indications of Congressional intent assumes that the suit is not one for
violation of a contract between the employer and the labor organization,
which is the very question to be decided. The exclusion of this suit there-
fore depends upon its characterization as one asserting "uniquely personal"
rights.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion, in which Justices Burton and Minton
joined, also reads Section 301 (a) as not attempting to confer jurisdiction
over this suit, but this interpretation results more from an attempt to avoid
constitutional problems than from an analysis of the relationships created
by collective bargaining agreements, or from an inquiry into congressional
intent. Justice Frankfurter rejects the Third Circuit analysis because it
denies the strong group interest in procuring for the employee the benefits
of the collective agreement and encourages manifestation of this interest by
way of strikes. 214 The opinion indicates that, absent other factors, he would
be inclined to permit the union to sue in this situation. After concluding
that the section is purely procedural and discussing the constitutional
difficulties which this conclusion raises, he states that these difficulties must
be avoided "through the orthodox process of limiting the scope of doubtful
legislation." Having decided that some limitation is necessary, Justice
Frankfurter justifies the exclusion of this suit on the grounds that, because
the section is procedural only, there is no need to burden the federal courts
with litigation based upon a violation of those terms in the collective agree-
ment which benefit the employee because the state courts recognize a cause
of action in the individual employee.
This case does not present an appropriate occasion for resorting to an
otherwise unnecessary limitation of the section in order to avoid con-
stitutional problems, for the problems raised are equally present in all suits
which the section permits. The limitation adopted here does not avoid the
necessity of deciding the constitutional issues; it merely postpones deci-
sion until the court is faced with a suit which cannot be excluded on some
other grounds. Consequently the distinction made by this opinion is be-
tween violations of those terms in the collective bargaining agreement which
are of peculiar benefit to employees and which give a right of action to the
individual employees, and those which do not.
Justices Douglas and Black, in dissent, considered the collective bar-
gaining system as a whole and refused to recognize the importance of any
distinction between the rights of the employees and those of the union.
The suit was analogized to the grievance procedure and was viewed as but
one aspect of the continuing, day-to-day administration of the collective
213. 75 Sup. Ct. 488, 501 (1955).
214. Id. at 498-99.
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bargaining agreement, an aspect in which the union was thought to have
a clear interest under the Act's concept of collective bargaining.
Although each of the opinions excluding the suit adopts a different
rationale, the differences in approach probably will not lead to different
results in the great majority of cases. All exclude suits relying upon provi-
sions in the collective agreement which supply the terms and conditions
under which the employee works and is to be paid, and all will presumably
include suits for violation of those provisions under which the union acts
as their representative. Between these two extremes lie those suits which
contain elements of both, notably those involving arbitration clauses. Under
the collective bargaining agreement the union participates in the arbitration
procedure, and under the Act the union has a right to be present at the
adjustment of grievances?'15 If the employee's claim to an extra day's
pay is subject to arbitration under the contract and the employer either
refuses to submit to arbitration or refuses to be bound by the award, a
question arises as to whether the union's suit to compel arbitration or to
enforce the award would be within the Court's interpretation of the sec-
tion. The obligation to arbitrate runs in favor of the union entity, but at
the same time the right to wages which is being asserted is the same right
involved in the Westinghouse case itself. Under Justice Reed's analysis of
the genesis of the rights created by the agreement it would seem that both
suits would be sustained as suits to enforce rights created by the arbitration
clause, notwithstanding the fact that one result would be to enforce rights
arising under the contract of hire. The opinions of Justices Warren and
Frankfurter also would probably permit both. Neither suit is an attempt
to enforce a "uniquely personal right" or is based upon clauses "peculiar
in the individual benefit which is their subject matter." Moreover, refusal
to arbitrate does not give rise to a cause of action in the individual
employee.2 18
Whatever the limitations which may be revealed by a close analysis
of the theories and language found in the opinions, suits to compel arbitra-
tion and to enforce an award present a situation which is very different
from that presented in the Westinghouse case in so far as the relationships
of employee, union and employer to one another are concerned. The deci-
sion is essentially a statutory interpretation and the opinions indicate that
it would take little in the way of practical necessity to change the result
in a given case.
CONCLUSION
Judicial construction of Section 301(a) during the eight years which
have elapsed since its enactment has produced only doubts of its validity
and uncertainty concerning its effect upon even ,the most basic problems
215. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952). Section 8(d) includes
in the duty to bargain a mutual obligation of the employer and representative to
meet and confer with respect to ". . . the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder. . . ." Id. at 142, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
216. United States v. Voges, 124 F. Supp. 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
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of employer-union contractual relations. The courts have failed to develop
a rationale which accords to arbitration its proper place in the day-to-day
operations of collective bargaining agreements; the remedies available
vary from court to court depending upon a particular court's interpreta-
tion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and Section 301(a) itself; and some
clauses of the collective contract are excepted from the operation of the
section. This uncertainty stems from the inherent lack of clarity in
Section 301(a) and clearly demonstrates that a grant of jurisdiction was
an inept method of achieving the results desired by the legislature. Con-
fronted with the grant of jurisdiction, the courts must choose between
reading some substantive content into the section or holding it uncon-
stitutional. If the Section is to be upheld, the courts are faced with an
additional choice between developing federal concepts and rules or applying
those of the states. The legislative history does not show that Congress
intended that the federal courts should develop a federal common law, and
such an excursion into the realm of labor policy should not be attempted
without a clear mandate from the policy-making branch. The general
confusion surrounding Section 301 (a) and the Westinghouse case itself
are convincing evidence of the undesirability and futility of embarking upon
such a task. On the other hand, a holding that the Section is unconstitu-
tional would completely nullify congressional intent. Therefore, the sub-
stantive content of Section 301 (a) should be limited to the principle of
enforceability and questions of validity and interpretation should be resolved
on this basis.
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